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6.1  Introduction 
The cost of capital in a country is a key variable determining that country’s 
ability to compete for internationally mobile capital. It sets the level of invest- 
ment in the economy and is thus a central factor in the determination of real 
wages and economic growth. In the United States, at least, the allegedly high 
cost of capital is often blamed for the slow rate of growth of productivity and 
the perceived loss of  international competitiveness. The same concerns are 
expressed in Canada, along with a host of additional factors. Among them are 
that tax changes in the U.S.,  if not matched by changes in Canada, can have 
adverse impacts on the Canadian economy. For instance, when the U.S. low- 
ered its basic federal corporate tax rate from 46 to 34 percent in 1986, concern 
was expressed that this might lead to large amounts of new debt financing by 
Canadian affiliates of U.S. corporations, and thereby erode the tax base of the 
Canadian corporate income tax. 
It is probably accurate to portray the U.S. and Canada as sharing a common 
capital or financial market. Because the U.S. economy is so large, it is likely 
that policies to encourage saving in the U.S. have significant impact on inter- 
est rates and other terms in world capital markets, whereas the effects of Ca- 
nadian saving policies on capital market terms are probably much less pro- 
nounced. It is probably reasonable to model Canada as a small open economy 
facing an exogenous rate of  return on financial capital. Whether that capital 
market is best characterized as a world capital market or one for North Amer- 
ica is open to question. 
A comparison of  the cost of capital in the two countries is interesting for 
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both policy makers and economists. One aspect of the question is whether the 
recent Canadian tax reforms have effectively alleviated the problem of erosion 
of the corporate tax base because of international financial shuffling. 
Both Canada and the U.S. are concerned not only with their relative costs 
of  capital, but also with their collective competitiveness with respect to the 
rest of the world. To gauge this relative position, we include in the paper some 
previous calculations from Bernheim and Shoven (1989) on the cost of capital 
in Japan. Japan is of  interest because it is the world’s largest capital market 
participant (aggregate investment and savings in Japan exceed the correspond- 
ing aggregates for the U.S.) and an important trading partner for both Canada 
and the U.S. 
The methodology  of this paper and the Bernheim-Shoven paper is fairly 
traditional and comparable in many respects to the detailed analyses of Boad- 
way,  Bruce, and Mintz (1987) of taxes on capital income in Canada.  Their 
work,  in turn, is related to the King-Fullerton (1984) study. Relative to this 
earlier work, however, the methodology of this paper emphasizes the role of 
risk premia in determining the cost of capital and the interaction of risk and 
tax considerations.  The cost-of-capital concept computed in this paper is ex- 
actly the same one that business people refer to as the “hurdle rate” for new 
investments. That is, it is the expected net rate of return before corporate taxes 
that is required in order for an incremental real investment to be in the interest 
of the owners of the firm. Unlike the procedure in most previous studies, the 
cost of capital is not presented as a single number, but rather as a schedule of 
figures for projects involving different amounts of risk. 
The plan of  this paper is to discuss the cost-of-capital  concept in section 
6.2. Section 6.3 deals with empirical difficulties in measuring the cost of cap- 
ital and describes the measurement approach taken in this paper. Section 6.4 
lays out the analytics for determining the cost of capital, given the terms in 
financial markets. That is, given the real interest rate and the expected return 
and riskiness of equity portfolios,  the cost of capital is derived for debt- and 
equity-financed projects. Section 6.5 briefly contrasts the tax systems of Can- 
ada, Japan, and the U.S., and includes a table of parameter values for capital 
market terms and tax regimes used in the cost of capital calculations. Section 
6.6 presents and interprets the results. 
6.2  Defining the Cost of Capital 
Although the cost of capital is a central concept in determining investment 
and economic growth, relatively  little empirical work has been done in actu- 
ally calculating its cost. Further, the work that has been done often uses incon- 
sistent and misleading definitions of the cost of capital. Three common mea- 
sures that appear in the literature are the real interest rate, the Hall-Jorgenson 
(1967) tax-adjusted real interest rate, and the weighted-average cost of capital 
(see for example, Copeland and Weston 1979, pp. 272-298).  All three have 219  The Cost of  Capital 
major flaws as measures of the cost of capital. The real interest rate ignores 
all tax and risk factors and is thus only appropriate as a hurdle rate for safe 
investments taxed exactly like Treasury bills. The Hall-Jorgenson approach 
adds detailed (corporate and personal) tax factors, but it still ignores all risk 
considerations. 
The weighted-average cost of  capital is the before-tax return necessary to 
offer competitive rates of return on all of the claims out against a firm, and is 
the correct cost-of-capital measure for the firm’s existing assets. However, it 
is inappropriate to use this measure as the hurdle rate for new investments, 
unless the new investments have exactly the same risk and return characteris- 
tics as the firm’s existing assets. For instance, General Motors can undertake 
a relatively risky project to develop improved solar cells and finance the un- 
dertaking with quite safe debt. To  act in the interest of  the shareholders, the 
appropriate hurdle rate should be tied to the riskiness of the incremental real 
investment, rather than to the relative safety of the debt. 
Corporate investment decisions should take into account the opportunity 
cost of the money. The fact that the corporation is making decisions about real 
investments (plant expansion, a truck,  or a new  computer network, for ex- 
ample) is immaterial. In order to be in a stockholder’s interest, risky real in- 
vestments at the corporate level have to be competitive with equally risky 
financial investments available in retail financial markets. 
Since observed risk premia in retail financial markets are quite large, the 
appropriate hurdle rate for risky real investments is much higher than for safe 
investments. The simplest illustration of  the risk premia is a comparison of 
long-run average real rates of return on a diversified portfolio of  common 
stocks with the average real returns on safe, short-term investments such as 
Treasury bills. In the U.S., the arithmetic-average real rate of  return on the 
Standard and Poor’s 500 between 1926 and 1989 was 8.8%, whereas the av- 
erage real return on U.S. Treasury bills was 0.5% (Ibbotson Associates 1990). 
In Canada, there was a similar gap between average equity and Treasury bill 
yields. Between 1950 and 1987, the average real rate of return of the Toronto 
Stock Exchange composite 300 was 7.5%, whereas the average real yield on 
Canadian Treasury bills was 1.2% (Hatch and White 1988). 
In this paper, we define the cost of capital as the expected rate of return (or 
hurdle rate) necessary to satisfy both financiers and tax authorities. This mea- 
sure includes an interest factor, a risk premium, and a number of tax factors. 
The first component in this calculation is the capital market line of the fa- 
miliar capital-asset pricing model (CAPM), which summarizes the financial 
market’s required expected returns on  securities of  different riskiness (see, 
e.g., Sharpe 1970). In figure 6.1, the intercept, R,, represents the real return 
on completely safe assets, whereas the point m  represents the expected return 
and riskiness of  a market portfolio or a standardized diversified portfolio of 
securities, such as the S&P 500. The riskiness of other investments is deter- 
mined as the systematic or nondiversifiable risk of the asset with respect to the 220  John B. Shoven and Michael Topper 
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Fig. 6.1  The capital market line 
market portfolio. Under the conventional assumptions of  the CAPM model 
(perfect securities markets,  no  restrictions on  short selling or borrowing, 
etc.), all investments must offer returns on the capital market line in order to 
be viable in the market. 
The second step is to calculate the necessary expected rate of return on real 
investments before corporate and personal taxes. The relationship between the 
cost-of-capital line, capital market line, and the post-tax return the investor 
ultimately realizes after the payment of  all corporate and personal taxes is 
illustrated in figure 6.2. 
6.3  Measuring the Capital Market Line 
In principle the capital market line can be simply constructed by observing 
two points on the line: the return on a zero-risk safe asset and the return on a 
market portfolio of given riskiness. In practice, this is no easy task. For short- 
term safe assets it is reasonable to assume that the expected return is the con- 
tractual return (e.g., Treasury bills). Of course, the capital market line is ex- 
1.  For readers familiar with the King-Fullerton framework (which did not include risk), these 
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pressed in real terms rather than in the nominal terms of the contracts. Also, 
Treasury bill yields are not perfectly safe in real terms. We  follow the usual 
procedure of ignoring this and assume that Treasury bill yields are safe and 
that the expected real return is equal to the contractual rate less the average 
rate of inflation over the past six or twelve months. 
The major problem is determining the expected return and standard devia- 
tion of  the market portfolio, since there are no contracts to refer to and the 
expected return is unobservable. If the monthly or annual real total (dividends 
plus real capital gains) rates of return on the market were independently drawn 
from an identical distribution, then the average of  a large number of realiza- 
tions would give an accurate measure of the expected future returns. Similarly, 
the standard deviation of realizations would give an accurate guide to the stan- 
dard deviation of the constant underlying real-rate-of-return distribution. Real 
returns in U.S. and Canadian equity markets do not seem to conform to the 
independent draws from an identical distribution model, however. The long- 
term average realization is very sensitive to the precise period covered. An 
example of this instability of average returns is shown in figure 6.3; while the 
ten-year average of  annual real returns on the Toronto Stock Exchange was 
8.33% between  1963 and 1972, it was only 0.10% between 1965 and 1974. 
This instability makes the past-realization approach unfeasible. The problem 
with using averages of past realizations as proxies for expected future rates of 
return on the market portfolio is that nonrecurring events (e.g., the formation 
of OPEC)  may greatly affect past realizations. 
The earnings-price ratio serves as a second possible proxy for the expected 
return on the market portfolio. Earnings are meant to reflect the amount of 
money a firm has left over after setting aside enough income to keep its capital 222  John B. Shoven and Michael Topper 
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Fig. 6.3  Ten-year average real rate of return on the market portfolio in 
Canada 
intact. If earnings were paid out to shareholders, then the shareholders would 
maintain a claim on a constant amount of capital. The only way that their total 
return could differ from the amount of earnings would be if the relative value 
of that constant amount of capital were to change. If  one expects the relative 
prices of the firm’s constant stock of  assets to remain unchanged, then the 
expected total return would equal earnings, and the expected rate of  return 
would be the earnings-price ratio. Although several accounting problems arise 
in measuring earnings, we adopt the annual average of monthly earnings-price 
ratios as our proxy for the expected return on the market portfolio. Boadway, 
Bruce, and Mintz use a similar procedure with an additional adjustment for 
inflation. In our base year of  1988, capital market lines based on E-P ratios 
are almost identical in the U.S. and Canada. 
The 1988 E-P figure for Canada is 8.33%, while for the U.S. it is 8.55%. 
The 1988 real Treasury bill rate for Canada is 4.02%; it is 3.91% for the U.S. 
The riskiness of the market portfolio (measured as the standard deviation in 
monthly returns) is 4.77% for the U.S. and 5.44% for Canada. These figures 
are the realized standard deviation in returns for the ten-year period 1979-88. 
Japanese equity markets featured very high rates of return in the 1980s and 
sharply increasing price-earnings ratios. Price-earnings ratios in Japan were 
lower than in the U.S. and Canada in 1970, but were almost 55 (or four times 
the levels in North America) by  1988. Even after adjusting Japanese earnings 
for U.S.  accounting practices and Japanese cross-ownership to make them 
comparable, the P-E ratio in Japan exceeded 30 in  1988,*  with a correspond- 
2.  See French and Poterba (1989) for details. 223  The Cost of  Capital 
ing E-P ratio of  3.1%. According to the E-P approach, the Japanese capital 
market line is much lower than the Canadian or the U.S.  capital market line, 
with higher equity prices effectively lowering the Japanese cost of  capital. 
Thus, the 1988 figures suggest an integrated North American financial market 
segmented from the Japanese market. 
6.4  An Analytical Calculation of the Cost of Capital 
In this section we derive the before-tax cost of capital faced by the firm as 
a function of  the interest rate, the risk aversion shown in the capital market 
line, and the design of the tax system. Consider a hypothetical investment 
project costing one dollar. Initially, consider a simple world without uncer- 
tainty or taxes. Iff’@) is the cash flow generated by the investment and s’ is 
the depreciation rate, then the project should be undertaken when the net-of- 
depreciation cash flow exceeds the real interest rate  i - D, where  i is the 
nominal interest rate on Treasury bills and D is the inflation rate. The cost of 
capital, 8 is the net cash flow that just satisfies this hurdle rate: 
(1) 
In this certain world without taxes, the relevant opportunity cost is the real 
rate of return on a safe financial asset. 
Now consider a world with uncertainty about both the cash flow generated 
by  the project (income risk) and the depreciation of  the investment (capital 
risk). The net-of-depreciation cash flow for a single period is then: 
P=f’(k) -  8 = i -  IT. 
(2) 
where Yj and Y3 are random variables capturing the uncertainty in income and 
capital risk,  respectively. When  Y3 is high, depreciation is low,  so that net 
income is high. Thus, positive values of Yfand Y3  both correspond to favorable 
returns for investors. 
Without loss of generality, assume that E(<) = 0 for j = f,S. For simplic- 
ity,  suppose that the  Y,  are distributed independently across periods. Since 
investors are risk-averse, a claim on Y, has negative value. Let V(x)  denote the 
certainty-equivalent value of the random variable x. Then 
f’(M  (1 + E/)  -  48 -  Eg), 
(3)  V(E,)  =  -A,, 
for  j  = 53.  One can also think of A,  as the risk premium that one must pay to 
an investor in order to induce him to hold the claim Y,. In practice, the value 
of  A,  will depend upon investors’ risk aversion, and upon the level of nondiv- 
ersifiable risk subsumed in Y,.  In certainty-equivalent terms, the total single 
period return is: 
(4)  f’(4  (1 -  A,)  -  (8 + Ag). 224  John B. Shoven and Michael Topper 
Now the proper hurdle rate is to accept all projects whose certainty-equivalent 
yield exceeds the real interest rate. If  one equates the above equation to i - 
f)  and solves for the cost of capital, the result is 
(5) 
with both types of risk premia (Afand A,)  increasing the cost of capital. 
The next step is to add tax considerations to this framework. Since equity 
and debt finance are taxed differently, the cost of  capital will vary with the 
source of  finance. In this section, we  outline the derivation of  the cost of 
capital for equity-financed investment.3 
The role of  taxes will depend on just which stockholders the investment- 
decision maker takes into account. Are they domestic owners or foreign own- 
ers? What tax brackets are domestic owners in? What taxes do foreigners pay 
on dividends, interest, and capital gains? This will be discussed again in the 
next two sections. For now,  the results will be derived for a relatively high- 
income domestic stockholder’s tax situation. 
P  =f(k) - 6 = (1 -  Af)-l(i  -  IT  + 6 + A,)  -  6, 
The new notation that needs to be introduced is: 
7  the corporate tax rate; 
m  the average marginal rate of  taxation for personal income in the form of 
interest; 
d  the average marginal rate of taxation for personal income in the form of 
dividends; 
z  the average rate of  taxation for personal income induced (either through 
future realized capital gains or future dividends) by real retained earnings; 
z,!  the average rate of taxation for personal income induced by nominal cap- 
ital gains on the stock of corporate capital (see below for further discus- 
sion); 
A  the present discounted tax value of depreciation allowances and tax credits 
associated with a unit of capital; 
A  the marginal propensity to pay dividends out of permanent changes in the 
level of earnings; 
A,  the marginal propensity to pay dividends out of transitory changes in the 
level of earnings; and 
q  marginal Tobin’s q (the ratio of  the marginal value of  installed capital to 
the replacement cost of capital). 
It will simplify the equations to follow if we let 
T = 1 -  ad -  (1 -  OL)Z 
3.  A more detailed analysis of  the equity-finance case, as well as the corresponding analytics 
for debt finance, can be found in Bemheim and Shoven (1989). 225  The Cost of  Capital 
and 
(7)  T, = 1 - a,d -  (1 -  CY,)Z. 
T and T, represent the fractions of one dollar of  permanent and transitory 
earnings, respectively, that are available for consumption by shareholders. 
Note that the government effectively pays A for a unit of investment, while 
the net cost to the investor is 1 -  A. The total random return on one dollar 
invested by a shareholder is 
(8)  (1 -  A)-’  {TLf’(k)  (1 -  T) -  6(1 -  A)] -  znnq 
+ T,[~,f’(k)  (1 -  7)  + ~g(1  -  A)]), 
where Y, and Yg  are realized randomly in each year. 
The above equation includes the term  -znDq. When the corporation in- 
stalls an additional unit of capital and finances this acquisition through equity, 
its value rises by  $9. If  it subsequently maintains higher capital stock by un- 
dertaking all necessary replacement investment, then in each period investors 
will accrue a nominal capital gain (in real dollars) of 0,.  It seems likely that 
most corporations would not raise dividends in a subsequent period after ac- 
cruing nominal gains on installed capital. In contrast, they might well subse- 
quently raise dividends in response to an increase in real retained earnings. 
Likewise, investors may have different patterns of realization for nominal and 
real gains. Accordingly, we have allowed for the possibility that z, (the aver- 
age marginal rate of  taxation on personal income induced by  nominal gains 
on corporate capital) may differ from z (the average marginal rate of taxation 
on personal income induced by real retained corporate earnings). 
The three appearances of (1 -  A)  in the equation may also require expla- 
nation. The first simply reflects the fact that one dollar buys (1 -  A)-I units 
of  incremental capital. The remaining two appearances reflect the effect of 
depreciation by replacement capital costing (1 -  A)  per unit. 
If  the corporation chooses the level of equity-financed investment to maxi- 
mize its value, then it must be indifferent about raising an additional dollar of 
capital. If  an investor contributes an additional dollar to the firm, its value 
rises by  (1 -  A)-  ’4. Indifference therefore implies that (1 -  A)  -  ’q = 1, or 
q = (1 -  A).  Making this substitution into the above equation and converting 
to certainty equivalents, by applying the function V(  .), one obtains 
(9)  (1 -  A)-’  {rlf’(k)  (1 -  T) -  6(1 -  A)] - T,[A,f’(k)  (1 -  T) + 
A,(  1 -  A)]} -  Z,T. 
As in the case without taxes, the certainty equivalent of  net income in any 
year must equal the real riskless after-tax rate of return. Since personal income 
taxes are levied on nominal interest payments, this return is i(1 -  m)  -  D. 
Setting these quantities equal and solving forf’(k) -  s’, one obtains 226  John B. Shoven and Michael Topper 
where p'  is the cost of equity-financed capital. 
The above equation is the basic formula for the cost of equity-financed cap- 
ital. Note that the corporate tax enters the cost of  capital only in the single 
term 
1  -A 
which multiplies both the real interest terms and the risk premia. If A were 
equal to 7,  as with expensing (where investors are allowed to deduct immedi- 
ately the full cost of  their investments, presuming that they have taxable in- 
come to offset), then the corporate tax would not affect the cost of  equity- 
financed capital at all. In that case, the government would effectively pay  a 
fraction of the cost of the investment (7)  and would receive the same fraction 
of  the cash generated by the project. Effectively, the government would be a 
proportional partner in the cost, return, and riskiness of the investment. With 
expensing, any investment undertaken  in the  absence of  the corporate tax 
would still be undertaken with the corporate tax. The same is true if the pre- 
sent value of  the sum of  the tax  savings from depreciation deductions and 
investment tax  credits equals T. For some investments (particularly equip- 
ment), this was the case after the U.S.  1981 tax reform. 
Since A is expressed in present-value terms that depend on the nominal rate 
of interest, which in turn depends on the inflation rate, the effect of  the cor- 
porate tax on the cost of capital and investment depends crucially on this rate 
of interest. This helps to reconcile the various contradictory claims about the 
Japanese tax system. On the one hand, a number of studies have found Japan 
to have one of  the world's  highest corporate tax  rates. On  the other hand, 
despite Japan's having depreciation schedules similar to those of the U.S. and 
Canada, other studies have found the Japanese corporate tax  system to be 
relatively nondistortionary. The explanation is that the tax system is less dis- 
tortionary because of the low Japanese nominal interest rates. One can see this 
most clearly by noting that at i = 0, A = 7,  and the corporate tax is nondis- 
tortionary regardless of the tax rate and the depreciation schedule. 
The A,  and A,  risk premia terms in the main formula are determined from 
the observed equity premium on the capital market line. In order to identify 
them with the available data, one has to assume that the fractions of  the total 
premium are attributable to income and depreciation risk. Following Bulow 
and Summers (1984),  we assume that 90  percent of  the total risk is due to 
depreciation risk. 227  The Cost of  Capital 
The cost-of-capital formula for debt finance corresponding to the formula 
for equity finance is: 
Note that the only difference between the equity and  debt cases are in  the 
terms multiplying i and D. These differences arise because corporate interest 
payments are deductible against the corporate income tax, whereas equity 
earnings are obviously not. Further, corporate interest income is taxed like 
Treasury bill interest at the personal level, while equity earnings are treated 
differently. 
6.5  Corporate and Personal Income Taxes in Canada, the U.S., 
and Japan 
Corporate tax systems in Canada, the U.S., and Japan share many features 
(Shoven 1989; Whalley 1990). Representative tax and market parameters for 
1988 are shown in table 6.1  .4 Although the tax code in each country contains 
special provisions for different industries, regions, and activities, these pa- 
rameters capture the main features of  each tax code in stylized form. 
Comprehensive tax reforms in Canada and the U.S. during the 1980s were 
motivated in part by the perception that uneven tax treatment of different as- 
sets and industries was leading to costly misallocations of capital. In  both 
countries, there was movement towards “leveling the playing field” by elimi- 
nating the investment tax credit, decelerating depreciation deductions, and 
bringing depreciation schedules into closer alignment with economic depre- 
ciati~n.~  In 1988 the Canadian and U.S. systems had very similar tax rates and 
depreciation schedules, reflecting concern with the mobility of capital and tax 
liabilities across the countries. 
The countries differ much more in their personal tax systems. Unlike the 
U.S., Canada attempts to offset double taxation of dividends partially by pro- 
viding a dividend tax credit against “grossed up” dividends at the personal 
level. This effectively reduces the total taxation faced by dividend payments. 
The Japanese have a somewhat similar dividend tax credit that allows divi- 
dends and interest to be taxed separately from other income, generally at 
lower rates. 
With respect to capital gains, the U.S. has moved to full taxation at the time 
of realization. Canada has a lifetime capital gains exclusion of  $lOO,OOO Ca- 
nadian dollars (on nonhousing capital gains; housing is treated separately). 
After using up the exclusion, three-quarters (two-thirds in 1988 and 1989) of 
realized capital gains are taxed at ordinary rates. Until the recent reform, cap- 
4.  Tax figures include statelprovincial taxes as well as federal taxes. 
5. In addition, Canada reduced special tax advantages for the Atlantic provinces. 228  John B. Shoven and Michael Topper 
Table 6.1  Parameter Values Used in the Calculation of the Cost of Capital in 
1988 
United States  Canada  Japan 
Corporate Tax Rate (7) 
Average Marginal Personal Tax 
Rate on Interest (m) 
Average Marginal Personal Tax 
Rate on Dividends (d) 
Effective Average Marginal Per- 
sonal Tax Rate on Retained 
Earnings (z) 
Effective Average Marginal Tax 
Rate on Purely Nominal Capi- 
tal Gains (2,) 
Fraction of Long-term Earnings 
Paid as Dividends (a) 
Fraction of Transitory Earnings 
Paid as Dividends (a,) 
Fraction of Total Risk Attribut- 
able to Capital Risk (q) 
Short-term Nominal Interest 
Rate (i) 
Expected Rate of Inflation (P) 
Exponential Rate of Deprecia- 
tion for Autos & Plants (6) 
Tax Depreciation Lifetimes for 
Autos & Plants (L) 
Present Value of Tax Value of 
Depreciation Deductions & 
Tax Credits for Autos & 
Plants (A) 
Expected Real Rate of Return on 
Market Portfolio from Ad- 
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"Actual Canadian depreciation is exponential at rates 30% for cars and 4% for buildings. 
ital gains on securities were not taxed at all in Japan. Even now, taxpayers are 
given the option of paying a tax equal to 1 percent of the value of  the stock 
transaction or paying a separate tax on the actual gain, at a rate of 20 percent. 
The 1-percent option would be chosen for all significant gain situations. Its 
availability means that capital gains remain extremely lightly taxed in Japan. 
A further difference is that Canadian interest is taxed more heavily than 
dividends (unlike interest in the U.S.),  and the effective rate of tax on capital 
gains is lower in Canada. The latter fact is due to the three-quarters inclusion 
rate (in contrast to full inclusion in the U.S.). We have assumed that the rep- 
resentative Canadian stockholder exhausts the $100,000 lifetime exclusion. 229  The Cost of  Capital 
6.6  Cross-country Cost-of-Capital Comparisons 
Cost-of-capital schedules for plants and cars in Canada, the U. S.,  and Japan 
are shown in figures 6.4~-d  and 6.5u, b. In all cases, the cost-of-capital lines 
are steeper than the capital market lines, reflecting a greater price of risk at the 
corporate level than at the investor level. Each of the tax systems discriminates 
against riskier investments, primarily because the present value of the tax ben- 
efits of the depreciation deduction, A, fall short of the corporate tax rate. This 
bias is strongest in Canada and weakest in Japan and is more severe for the 
relatively long-lived plant. 
In all cases, the cost of capital with debt finance is less than with equity 
finance, reflecting the deductibility of  interest payments from the corporate 
income tax. This difference is much smaller in Canada than in the U.S. be- 
cause of the dividend tax credit system, lower effective  capital gains rates, and 
higher personal taxes on interest income in Canada. In Canada, the advantage 
of debt at the corporate level is almost completely offset by its disadvantage at 
the personal level. Despite these differences between the Canadian and U.S. 
schedules, the cost of capital is close enough in the two countries that differ- 
ences in hurdle rates are unlikely to be a key factor in  investment location 
decisions. 
In both countries, however, risk premia are large and the cost of capital for 
even moderately risky undertakings can be substantial compared to real inter- 
est rates. In Canada, the cost of capital for an investment with a standardized 
riskiness of 5 percent per month is about 13 percent for plant and 11 percent 
for autos for both debt and equity financing. The U.S. numbers are slightly 
higher than the Canadian ones for equity-financed capital and somewhat lower 
for debt-financed investments. 
The cost of capital in Japan is substantially lower than in North America, 
primarily because of cheaper equity finance. The tax system plays a relatively 
minor direct role in determining the low cost of  capital in Japan. The cost of 
capital for investments of the riskiness discussed above is roughly 5 percent 
in Japan. The evidence points to an integrated U.S.-Canada capital market, 
with a segmented one in Japan offering far better terms for new investments. 
The results reported above are based on the decisions of managers acting 
on behalf of relatively high-income domestic owners. If, on the other hand, 
the ownership of a company is internationally diversified, a manager may con- 
clude that the interests of  the owners are best served by making sure all in- 
vestments offer certainty-equivalent yields at least as great as Treasury bills, 
taking only corporate taxes into account. The representative owner, in effect, 
is treated as tax-free. The cost of capital for Canada and the U.S. under these 
assumptions is shown in figure 6.6u-d. The gap between the cost of equity- 
and debt-financed capital widens considerably in Canada because the relative 
tax preference for equity income for Canadian stockholders is no longer rele- 0'  I  I  ,  1  I  I  I  I 
12345678910 
SYSTEMATIC RISK  (IN %  PER  MONTH) 
-  COST CAPITAL-EQUIP ..-......  COST CAPITAL-DEBT -  CAPITAL MARKET LINE 






g  0.1 
w 
4  2 0.05 
z 
0  5 
I  I  I  ,  I  I  8  I  1  I  I 
0  12  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
SYSTEMATIC  RISK  (%  PER  MONTH) 
I -  COST CAPITAL-EQUITY  COST CAPITAL-DEBT -  CAPITAL MARKET LINE  I 
Fig. 6.4b  Cost of capital in U.S. in 1988 for equity- and debt-financed plant Oa3/ 
0 
12345678910 
SYSTEMATIC  RISK (IN Z  PER MONTH) 
I -  COST CAPITAL-EQUITY  ~~~~~~~-~  COST CAPITAL-DEBT -  CAPITAL MARKET LINE  I 
Fig. 6.4~  Cost of capital in Canada in 1988 for equity- and debt-financed  cars 











u  !g  0.1 
w 
3 0.05 
0  I 
10  0123456789 
SYSTEMATIC  RISK  (%  PER MONTH) 
I  --  COST CAPITAL-EQUITY ....--...  COST CAPITAL-DEBT -  CAPITAL MARKET LINE 1 
~~ 
Fig. 6.4d  Cost of capital in U.S. in 1988 for equity- and debt-financed  cars 232  John B. Shoven and Michael Topper 
2 0  09- 
I 
:  0.08- 
p: 
3 007- 
".  . , 
J 
I-  < 0.01 - 
L  2 001- 
0.1  , 
vant. The basic conclusion, however, remains that the Canadian and American 
cost-of-capital figures are very comparable. 
6.7  Concluding Remarks 
This paper has calculated the cost of capital in Canada, the U.S.,  and Japan 
in 1988, using a framework that accounts for both risk and tax considerations 
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interest in the policy debate about recent Canadian and U.S. tax reforms and 
the international competitiveness of North American firms. 
First, risk premia are extremely important components of the cost of capi- 
tal. In all three countries, the corporate and personal tax systems magnify risk 
premia; that is, the extra return required of risky real investments at the cor- 
porate level exceeds the premium apparent in financial markets. 
Second, Canada and the U.S.  have a common financial market and have 234  John B. Shoven and Michael Topper 
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adopted tax systems that give similar treatment to risky investments. The re- 
sult is that for a particular investment the cost of capital is similar in Canada 
and the U.S. This suggests that investment location decisions will be driven 
by  productivity factors, and not distorted by  tax  and financial market con- 
cerns. 
Finally, the Japanese have a large cost-of-capital advantage relative to both 
Canada and the U.S. This differential stems from high Japanese equity prices 
and the correspondingly low cost of  risk capital, with tax factors playing a 235  The Cost of Capital 
relatively minor role.  Thus, the evidence suggests that Japanese and North 
American financial markets are currently segmented, although the increased 
globalization of  financial markets will tend to equalize this differential over 
time. 
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